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J. Goodhand, D. Hulme and N. Lewer
Analysis of case studies
Militarised violence has had a major impact on the physical, human, social and
natural capital of Sri Lanka. Although the so-called ‘ethnic conflict’ in the north-east
is spatially defined, the case studies demonstrate that militarised violence has become
an island-wide and endemic feature of Sri Lankan society. Militarised violence has
taken many forms; in the north it has included conventional warfare, predatory
violence and show killings. In the south it has included LTTE suicide attacks, the
bombing of economic targets, political violence (particularly at election times) and a
growing problem of army deserters in rural areas in the south.
Although ‘the conflict’ is frequently analysed as though it has a life of its
own that is separate from society, we will argue that violent conflict is ‘owned’ by
and embedded in society. In Sri Lanka, as the case studies show, violent conflict is
extremely variegated, taking different forms, involving different kinds of actors and
interacting with different social environments.
David Keen (2000) usefully distinguishes between top-down and bottom-up
violence. Top-down violence refers to violence that is mobilised by political leaders
and entrepreneurs. Bottom-up violence, on the other hand refers to violence that is
embraced by ordinary people. In Sri Lanka one can find examples and combinations
of both types of violence.
A range of different political and military actors are involved in mobilising
violence from the top. There are a number of armed forces in addition to LTTE that
are not 100 per cent under political control including police commandos (Special
Task Force), the armed bodyguards of MPs, Tamil militant groups, Home Guards,
and army deserters. In the north-east, the army has ‘franchised out’ security functions
to Tamil paramilitary groups such as the Rasiq group, TELO and PLOTE who are
involved in community-level intelligence and terror. Such groups are only loosely
controlled and are responsible for widespread human rights abuses. Militarised
violence has become increasingly decentralised and some argue that the conflict has
assumed the characteristics of a ‘dirty war’ (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999). The Sri
Lankan conflict has been called a ‘no mercy’ war as out of 10 estimated casualties on
the battlefield, only one survives as wounded, compared to the accepted average of 7
(
Philipson, 2000: 69).
Although, particularly in the border areas, violence may appear to be
senseless and anarchic, it serves important functions and has become a means of
acquiring profit, power and protection (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999). Establishing
precisely what motivates conflict entrepreneurs is difficult. First, because there is
surprisingly little information and serious analysis of LTTE or other Tamil militant
groups. Second, there are differing narratives of violence, and what people say may
conceal their real motives. Collier (2000), for example, argues that rebel movements
cloak their motives in a narrative of ‘grievance’ but their primary motives may be
‘
greed’. In other words it is less about politics than economics. In Sri Lanka, however,
one cannot dismiss ‘grievance’; the LTTE and SLAF, the two primary actors, are
oriented towards changing (or retaining) the laws and administrative procedures of
society (Keen, 2000: 23). Rather than thinking in terms of ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’, as
Keen argues, we need to understand better how the two interact.
Bottom-up violence serves a variety of functions. Interviews revealed a
number of motivations including: political (for example, fighting for a separate state);
protection (‘now we are safe because we don’t come under the control of the army’);